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Kevin Wheeler

Mao Zedong and Mohandas Gandhi: Revolutionary
Pragmatists?
By Kevin Wheeler

Abstract: Before 1949, both China and India experienced protracted
struggles to gain freedom from their respective governing bodies.
Although the Chinese and Indian Revolutions occurred during the same
time period, and on the same continent, little energy has been spent on
comparing the two in any appreciable manner, even less so when it
comes to the leaders of the movements themselves. Granted, the
reasoning for this is due to the belief that Mao Zedong and Mohandas
Gandhi are too dissimilar for any fruitful analysis to be obtained by
juxtaposing them, but this paper’s focus is on proving that they are far
more alike than anyone has ever given them credit. Both men were
pragmatic revolutionaries who adapted to the needs of their movements,
and were willing to be flexible to new developments which could
potentially alter fundamental underpinnings of their uprisings. With the
preexisting notions of class struggle and violence which have so
characterized Mao Zedong in the past, it may be absurd to claim him as
a pragmatist, but in reality, he was in fact a powerful coalition builder
before the People’s Republic of China was founded. Furthermore,
Mohandas Gandhi is seen as the principal advocate of non-violence in
recent memory, but he accepted violence to avoid cowardice, and only
came to the stance of non-violence after observing firmer approaches
earlier in his life. Even though the two men arrived at different
conclusions of how to best achieve victory, they did so for the identical
reason of it being in the best interests of the Indian and Chinese freedom
organizations. Most importantly, both revolutionaries came to personify
their movements, and that accounts for their “god-like” standing in
historical texts. This paper is intended to bring Mao and Gandhi down
from their mythologized status and to see them for who they were during
their revolutions, ordinary human beings who were pragmatic enough to
sustain the momentum of their individual movements. Without their
realism, the Indian and Chinese Revolutions would have been radically
different.
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Introduction
Adapting to current conditions is a necessary feature of any revolution,
but this creates internal conflicts which are inherently different. Failing
to adapt leads to rigidity, which in turn causes a near-certain failure to
the insurrection and a possible collapse of the entire revolutionary
movement. Strong leaders who are able to adapt to existing situations are
vital to the success of any uprising, and both Mohandas Gandhi (18691948) and Mao Zedong (1893-1976) were consummate pragmatists in
their respective countries. They are among the most important figures in
Asia during this time period, and little has been done to compare their
views. While both men had fundamentally different philosophies on how
to bring about revolutionary change, which might make comparison
seem fruitless, research has shown that they may be more similar than
previously believed. Essentially, they chose those different ideals for
identical reasons.
The purpose of this paper is to show that without the flexibility
and modifications of Mao Zedong and Gandhi to better conform to their
environments, the Indian and Chinese Revolutions would have been
radically different, because there was no other individual who could have
taken their place and maintained the level of revolutionary fervor they
engendered. As a result, the time period examined here will be almost
exclusively pre-1949 due to: the Indian Revolution succeeding with the
withdrawal of the British in 1947 and Gandhi being assassinated in 1948,
and Mao Zedong overthrowing the Nationalist Party and proclaiming the
People’s Republic of China on October 1, 1949.
In addition, this endeavor is further aimed at discussing the
similarities and differences between their theories and ideologies in order
to arrive at a clearer understanding of why Mao and Gandhi, although
contemporaries in Asia, chose radically differently philosophies but were
nonetheless still able to succeed. The reason for their success stems from
their ability to conform to the needs of the time. It is entirely likely that
they were only ones capable of accomplishing this vital task.
A great deal of Gandhi’s beliefs and convictions stemmed from
his studies in England and from his involvement as a member of the
ambulance corps during various wars in South Africa. During return trips
to India, he became increasingly embroiled in the struggle of his people
against British rule, which led him on the path to becoming a
revolutionary. While he was the embodiment of the term
“revolutionary,” he was far more like a social reformer and diplomat
which caused him to become the leader of a revolutionary movement.
Gandhi did not seek the leadership of the Indian organization, but
accepted it because he possessed the charisma to deal with the British on
their terms in order to obtain a favorable conclusion to their existing
strife. Unlike him in a vast variety of ways, Mao Zedong remained

18

Kevin Wheeler

radical throughout his entire life. His beliefs in “permanent revolution”
and violent upheaval led to constant political problems and bordered on
anarchism at times. Mao had never studied outside of China and only
went as far as Beijing University, the place where his actual Communist
ideals took root under the tutelage of the Chinese innovator of Marxism
and Beijing University librarian, Li Dazhao (1888-1927).
Mohandas Gandhi and Mao Zedong personified their
revolutions. Even though there were other skilled leaders present, such as
Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai (who were more behind-the-scenes
contributors to their movements), they were the only likely candidates
able to lead their revolutions effectively. The reasoning for this assertion
is the result of their ability to adjust their ideologies to best represent
their respective peoples. In essence, Mao and Gandhi created a
dependency on their presence, because of the pragmatism they espoused.
The sheer amount of similarities revealed here between one of the most
violent revolutionaries in history, and the greatest advocate of nonviolence in the twentieth century, is remarkable.
The Path to Pragmatism
At their core, both revolutionaries fought for, and even against, similar
concepts and figures. Gandhi was a man of compromise and
understanding, while Mao was radical and violent for the most part. The
former was a student of the British who found that the best way to get
them to leave his country was working with them (In a diplomatic sense,
i.e. through compromise and understanding. This is true even with the
reality that the movement as a whole obviously worked against British
interests through non-cooperation with laws they disagreed with.) toward
that goal based on his extensive experience with the police in South
Africa1 instead of using force as the latter believed was necessary.2 Much
of this stemmed from Gandhi’s spirituality, which drove him to live his
life in a way which would not bring shame to him or anyone else; he
chose to live by the principle of “Hate the sin, not the sinner,”3 and
believed that “To slight a single human being is to slight those divine
powers, and thus to harm not only that being but with him the whole
world.”4 Nevertheless, Gandhi still retained the seemingly contradictory
feeling that “where there is only a choice between cowardice and

1

Mohandas Gandhi, An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with
Truth (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 275-76.
2
Mao Tse-Tung, On Revolution and War, ed. M. Rejai (Garden City New York:
Doubleday and Company Inc., 1969), 57.
3
Gandhi, 276.
4
Ibid.
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violence, I would advise violence.”5 In his country, Mao felt that
“Without armed struggle the proletariat and the Communist Party would
have no standing at all in China, and it would be impossible to
accomplish any revolutionary task.”6 The point is, however, that both
men were the products of whatever circumstances they found themselves
in (as will be discussed next) and had learned to adapt to what they
believed was necessary to further their personal and public goals.
From his youth, Gandhi had made the conscious decision to
become a vegetarian and follow the instructions of his mother
vehemently while studying law in London7 and while in South Africa
where he participated in the Boer War and the Zulu Rebellion as an
ambulance attendant.8 This, for lack of a better phrase, strict adherence to
instructions and a policy of not hurting animals by refusing meat, laid a
firm foundation for his later beliefs in non-violence and peaceful noncooperation. Regardless, Gandhi was not a revolutionary in the common
understanding of the word (i.e. “rebel,” “insurrectionist,” or “renegade”),
for a number of reasons. For instance, he believed that even if his people
had the weapons to seize the country by force, they most likely would
not have chosen to do so because it was not in the nature of the majority
of the Indian people.9 While he may have led a movement against them
and was anti-imperialistic, Gandhi never saw the British people
themselves in a negative light, something which he believed had been
misunderstood by the government in London. “India has no quarrel with
the British people. I have hundreds of British friends. Andrews’
friendship was enough to tie me to the British people. But both he and I
were fixed in our determination that British rule in India, in any shape or
form, must end.”10 In fact, due to those cordial relations, many
Englishmen in India began seeing the British presence there in the same
way that Gandhi and his movement did; it was not a benevolent force,
but a burdensome overseer.11 This growing sentiment, along with his
own experiences with them in England and with the police in South

5

Mark Juergensmeyer, Gandhi’s Way A Handbook of Conflict Resolution
(USA: University of California Press, 2002), ix.
6
Mao, 57.
7
Gandhi, 38-39.
8
Samuel Farber, “Violence and Material Class Interests: Fanon and Gandhi,”
Journal of Asian and African Studies 16, no. 3/4 (1981): 202.
9
Robert Blackey and Clifford Paynton, Revolution and the Revolutionary Ideal
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1976) p. 147.
10
Mohandas Gandhi, My Appeal to the British, ed. Anand T. Hingorani (New
York: John Day Company, 1942), 19.
11
Ibid., 18-19, 24, 37.
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Africa, made him come to see them as capable of both reason and
cooperation.12
Mao never had such amicable relations with an imperial power,
or even his family for that matter. Much like Gandhi, Mao’s mother
meant a great deal to him (some scholars, such as Lowell Dittmer, have
claimed he had an Oedipus complex),13 but his father was a deep-rooted
source for his inclination toward conflict.14 Growing up in a small village
in a rural area of Hunan Province in southern China, Mao’s many
neighbors still lived under the same backward technological, social, and
economic conditions that existed in the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), and
his father came to symbolize that old way of life to Mao, politically and
socially.
My mother was a kind woman, generous and
sympathetic, and ever ready to share what she had. She
pitied the poor and often gave them rice when they came
to ask for it during famines. But she could not do so
when my father was present. He disapproved of charity.
We had many quarrels in my home over this question.
There were two “parties” in the family. One was my
father, the Ruling Power. The Opposition was made up
of myself, my mother, my brother, and sometimes even
the laborer. In the “united front” of the Opposition,
however, there was a difference of opinion. My mother
advocated a policy of indirect attack. She criticized any
overt display of emotion and attempts at open rebellion
against the Ruling Power. She said it was not the
Chinese way. 15
Mao became frustrated with the selfish rigidity of his father’s feeling that
his son should serve the family in accordance with Confucian values.
With this inflexible attitude, and the rebellious tendencies of a youth,
Mao acted out against his father on numerous occasions,16 a tendency
that never subsided. It follows that when faced with a similar wall later in
his life, that of the state of his country and people, he would again defy
authority; in his case, this included several imperialistic countries and
eventually the Nationalist Party under Chiang Kai-shek as well. This was
12

Kamlesh Mohan, “An Assessment of the Gandhian Attitude towards Militant
Nationalists in the 1920’s,” The Quarterly Review of Historical Studies 18, no. 2
(1978): 103.
13
Lowell Dittmer, “Mao and the Politics of Revolutionary Morality,” Asian
Survey 3, no. 27 (1987): 317.
14
Ibid., 317-18.
15
Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1968): 132.
16
Dittmer, 318.
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a task that Mao described as: “the overthrow of three mountainsfeudalism, imperialism, and the comprador bourgeoisie" (the latter being
the indirect imperialism through Chiang Kai-shek).17 Multiple foes, with
multiple agendas, helped pave the way for Mao to accept violent
revolution as the only possible solution to the existing state of China.
Both men were ideally suited to lead given the context of their
regions, but it was still necessary for them to adapt their ideologies to the
circumstances of the people themselves by being pragmatic about their
situation, in order to win them over. As with any revolution, there are
always numerous ideas, figures, and avenues people wish to support in
order to succeed in achieving political power. It is essential that either a
single person, or idea, predominates over others, or that all of the
different plans to bring about change are reconciled with one another at
some point. Gandhi and Mao were able to do this and consequently
became the unquestioned leaders of their revolutionary movements by
committing a great deal of time and effort toward that goal.
Of the two men, Mao, had the hardest time achieving party
dominance, but Gandhi did have some difficultly as well. The Chinese
Revolution had a great many people who could possibly lead it, and
many did at varying times. This caused disunity and fragmentation
within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), characteristics which
Communism and Leninism were not supposed to have. The largest
hurdle that Mao had to contend with, and the one which brought him to
dominance once he overcame it, was defeating Wang Ming, Li Lisan, the
“28 Bolsheviks,” and the Comintern representatives (most notably Otto
Braun) who wanted to “Bolshevize” the party and get them away from
relying on the peasants instead of adapting to what the movement
actually needed.18 These men had been trained in Moscow by the Soviet
Union and felt they knew what was best for the party to succeed against
the Nationalists. However, their short stints as leaders of the party ended
after their policies failed to protect the Jiangxi Soviet from Chiang Kaishek’s extermination campaigns, because they insisted on utilizing
conventional warfare against Nationalist armies. Mao had always
advocated for guerilla tactics to be used in pairing with other forms of
warfare, and this had mainly worked in holding off numerous attacks on
their base areas, both before and after he rose to power.19 As Mao told
Edgar Snow: “This does not mean the abandonment of vital strategic
points, which can be defended in positional warfare as long as profitable.
17

Tan Chung, “Chinese History and the Chinese Revolution: On the Dynamism
of Marxism and Mao Zedong Thought,” China Report 26, no. 1 (1990): 7.
18
Nick Knight, “Working Class Power and State Formation in Mao Zedong’s
Thought 1931-1934,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 32, no. 1 (2002): 33.
19
Mao Tse-Tung, On the Protracted War (Peking: People’s Publishing
House/Foreign Language Press, 1960): 104.
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But the pivotal strategy must be a war of maneuver, and important
reliance must be placed on guerilla and partisan tactics. Fortified warfare
must be utilized, but it will be of auxiliary and secondary importance.”20
Otto Braun and Wang Ming, however, managed to convince the party
that they instead had to adopt the same conventional military blockhouse
tactics being employed by Chiang Kai-shek in order to gain decisive
victories over him. They wanted to exclusively use conventional warfare,
instead of it being used in the background as Mao had planned.
Following this policy led to the famous “Long March” and the Zunyi
Conference of 1935 where Mao rose to unquestioned party dominance
due to his successful tactics, charisma, and advocacy that the peasants
had to be the main revolutionary apparatus rather than the small and
weak urban proletariat.21
Thus, his admiration for the revolutionary potential of
the peasants was balanced by a realistic assessment of
their shortcomings as a class, and their urgent need for
leadership by the working class and its vanguard party.
His words then were certainly not those of a
revolutionary who willingly embraced rural revolution
and uncritically revered the revolutionary potential of the
peasantry. They were, rather, the words of one who finds
himself forcibly separated from the cities and the
working class, and compelled to find a strategy which
could exploit the dissatisfaction of the peasantry and
channel their revolutionary impulse in the direction of a
modernising revolution. Mao did not, therefore, lose
sight of the need for working class leadership of the
Chinese revolution, and his words and policies of the
Jiangxi Soviet are consistent with those of both the 192730 and post-1949 periods.22
This pragmatism was vital to installing Mao in the position of party
leader following the failures of his peers. Even as early as 1936, under
his leadership, “the Communists (and the Comintern) had radically
changed their position. In a search for broad national unity, they included
the Kuomintang and even Chiang Kai-shek…provided that the latter
would agree to ‘establish democratic representative government, resist
Japan, enfranchise the people, and guarantee civil liberties to the

20

Snow, 112.
Mao, On Revolution and War, 10-11.
22
Knight, “Working Class Power and State Formation in Mao Zedong’s
Thought 1931-1934,” 33-34.
21

23

Mao Zedong and Mohandas Gandhi

masses.’”23 Claiming Mao was a pragmatist, “whose genius consisted not
only in a brilliant clarity of mind but in an almost uncanny understanding
of Chinese peasant problems,”24 and who carefully and thoughtfully
altered his beliefs to the circumstances of his movement, may sound
inherently absurd with the ideas of violence and class struggle which has
so characterized people’s memories of him in the past; but during critical
times of conflict in the pre-1949 era, he continually distinguished himself
as a pragmatist and coalition builder.
In India, there were fewer people who could have taken the reins
of leadership than there were in China, mainly due to the country having
been a fully absorbed crown colony of the British for so long, unlike
China which had endured centuries of dynastic and quasiimperial/colony status by several different nations. One of the only
noteworthy examples of who could have led were the Militant
Nationalists,25 and with the nervousness of the Indian people in this time
period toward open conflict (a nature which Gandhi shared, even
admitting that he himself was a rather shy person for most of his life,
something which he “never completely overcame”),26 few could resist in
an overtly militaristic way as they advocated. Gandhi may not have been
a particularly charismatic man, but he did know how to speak with
ordinary people and make them understand that they had to work
together in order to defy British rule. Unity was absolutely necessary due
to how fragmented the country was along religious and caste lines, and
because “he was also convinced that the people’s united struggle alone
could overthrow colonialism.”27 In his eyes, only a concerted effort that
had the backing of the entire country could force the British to accept the
desire of the Indian people to rule themselves, and this would encourage
them to withdraw willingly, and peacefully.28
Both men were able to dominate the leadership of their
respective movements by unseating the opposition with the pragmatic
promotion of their ideals. While other people may have led the Chinese
and Indian Revolutions at one point or another, only Mao and Gandhi
personified those revolutions by eventually emerging as the ones who
could meet the needs of the people and take advantage of the climate of
the time. As a result, they succeeded not only in bringing the desired
revolutionary change, but also being the only ones who adjusted to the
23

Snow, 102.
Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder out of China, (USA: Da
Capo Press, Inc., 1980): 238.
25
Mohan, “An Assessment of the Gandhian Attitude towards Militant
Nationalists in the 1920’s,” 103-104.
26
Gandhi, An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth, 59-61.
27
Mohan, “An Assessment of the Gandhian Attitude towards Militant
Nationalists in the 1920’s,” 105.
28
Ibid.
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necessities of their movements in order to bring about that change to
begin with.

Convergent Pragmatism
Although both men had different ways of accomplishing the changes
they desired, they had similar views on the need to utilize all levels of
society to succeed in gaining autonomy from foreigners. This view can
be seen in Mao and Gandhi’s use of the peasantry and the masses, one of
the few, but important, similarities that can be found between them.
China and India in general were similar in that they were subordinated to
imperial powers: India directly as a British crown colony, China
indirectly through the rule of the Guomindang/Kuomintang and through
the system of treaty ports/concessions with foreign nations throughout
the twentieth century. Both countries had been violently suppressed by
force of arms in the past, and this created a seething desire to rid
themselves of colonizers. In India, on April 13, 1919, General Dyer
ordered “the firing of 1,650 rounds of ammunition without warning at a
peaceful crowd, [and] regarded it as an opportunity to show people the
might of the British Empire for he imagined that ‘the Lord hath delivered
them into my hands.’”29 This event, which became known as the
Jallianwala Bagh Massacre (or more commonly, the Amritsar Massacre)
left 379 dead, and possibly 1,200 wounded.30 The killing did not end on
that day, and continued for several more throughout the area.
“Henceforth, political awakening and disillusionment with British rulers
grew at a rapid pace.”31 Similarly, on May 30, 1925, demonstrators (who
were demanding the release of a number of imprisoned students that had
been arrested for protesting against work closures at a Shanghai textile
mill) were fired upon by a British inspector; “eleven were killed and at
least twenty wounded.”32 A month later, another 52 were killed and over
100 more were wounded protesting these original deaths. “The
humiliation of having foreign troops on Chinese soil who could kill with
impunity led to an unprecedented anti-imperialist explosion that
considerably increased the visibility of the CCP and the Guomindang.”33
The May 30th Movement (as it became known as) and the Jallianwala
Bagh Massacre fostered an intense anti-imperialism and caused a surge
29

Mohan Kamlesh, “The Jallianwalla Bagh Tragedy and its Impact as a Catalyst
of Indian National Consciousness,” International Journal of Punjab Studies 3,
no. 2 (1996): 164.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid., 168.
32
R. Keith Schoppa, Revolution and Its Past: Identities and Change in Modern
Chinese History (U.S.A. Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2010): 191.
33
Ibid.
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of nationalism and revolutionary fervor among the Chinese and Indian
people. These events (and the outrage caused by them) laid crucial
groundwork which Gandhi and Mao expanded on and would utilize to
further stimulate their movements. Both men were anti-imperialistic, and
even though they saw different ways of dealing with it, they chose to
adapt to these existing circumstances within their organizations. By
doing so, they were able to make use of not only the peasantry, but also
the nation as a whole. To put it succinctly, living under the occupation of
foreign troops was rapidly becoming intolerable for everyone involved.
On the topic of peasantry and class roles, one must begin with
Mao Zedong because the topic is invariably linked to him. That said,
however, the common belief that he exclusively relied on the peasantry
and was not a Marxist-Leninist at all (instead only forming a Maoism) is
unfounded.34 The reason for this lies in the overall point that he had to
adapt to China’s existing state of affairs and be a more “pragmatic
Marxist.”35 As Mao put it many times, building on the words of the
deceased first leader of the Nationalist Party, Sun Yat-sen, China had a
“semi-feudal and semi-colonial status”36 in the world, and the vast
majority of the population were farmers and peasants. As a result, the
proletariat/urban working class was simply too small to be an effective
revolutionary force on their own,37 something that traditional Marxists
believed was required to succeed in an uprising. Even though it can be
questioned if Mao actually possessed an “admiration for the innate
‘wisdom’ of the peasantry” and acknowledged an “ardent faith in the
revolutionary creativity of the rural masses,”38 he came to rely on them
regardless, whether he was mystified by them or not. Due to this, “Mao
supposedly revealed a singular and conscious disregard for the
theoretical strictures of Marxism,”39 and consequently, it is more
appropriate to call Mao a Leninist rather than an outright Marxist or
Maoist. This is because Lenin advocated a more pragmatic view that
utilized everyone in Russia and turned the focus away from the
proletariat as the sole group for revolutionary action during a time when
it was still in a much similarly backward state as in China.40

34

Nick Knight “Mao Zedong and the Peasants: Class Power in the Formation of
a Revolutionary Strategy,” China Report 40, no. 49 (2004): 50-51.
35
Ibid., 50.
36
Mao, On Revolution and War, 74-75.
37
Ibid., 8.
38
Knight, “Mao Zedong and the Peasants: Class Power in the Formation of a
Revolutionary Strategy,” 50.
39
Ibid., 51.
40
Arif Dirlik, “The Predicament of Marxist Revolutionary Consciousness: Mao
Zedong (Mao TseTung), Antonio Gramsci, and the Reformulation of Marxist
Revolutionary Theory,” Modern China 9, no. 2 (1983): 192.
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Knowing that China was so dependent on the peasantry and that
its industrial class would not support a revolution, Mao advocated the use
of the peasantry as the primary force for their insurrection. While he did
have a great deal of support from other members of the CCP on this, he
was continually opposed by many people (mentioned earlier) who
adhered to a more “orthodox” version of Marxism that called for a
proletarian revolution alone and who did their best to steer Mao away
from his reliance on the peasantry. Regardless of this opposition, Mao
was able to win over leadership of the party for a number of reasons, but
the most relevant here was his confidence in the peasantry, and his
compromise in which he still called for a revolution that was proletarian
led, even if the membership was not proletarian dominated. One
noteworthy example was the way he organized the CCP with
“democratic centralism” and the “mass line” in which everyone’s ideas
would ultimately be filtered and controlled by only a small number of
people.41 This compromise, which was one of many before he became
more authoritarian in 1942 during the Rectification Campaign (this will
be discussed further in the following section), led to his becoming the
unquestioned leader of the party and his eliminating of anyone else who
could have led during this time period; this essentially created a
dependency on Mao’s guidance in order to maintain the same
revolutionary fervor that had begun to wane at the outset of the Long
March.
Returning more to the peasantry and masses specifically, though,
“Mao developed a model for revolution that was successful in
encouraging mass peasant support while making clear the revolution
would not be led by the peasantry.”42 Simply, he could only see them as
conservative and difficult to work with,43 but also necessary to win the
revolution.44 Ultimately, even though he wanted to make use of everyone
and had advocated a peasant-centric CCP since nearly the beginnings of
the party, and especially after the White Terror and subsequent collapse
of the First United Front in 1927, Mao remained in the position of having
a proletarian-led revolution.45 Much like a true Marxist, he still viewed
the proletariat as a better choice for revolutionary leadership, because:
The Chinese proletariat is more resolute and
thoroughgoing in revolutionary struggle than any other
class because it is subjugated to a threefold oppression
41

Ibid., 198.
Knight, “Working Class Power and State Formation in Mao Zedong’s
Thought 1931-1934,” 43.
43
Ibid., 30.
44
Ibid., 43.
45
Ibid., 42-43.
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(imperialist, bourgeois, and feudal) which is marked by a
severity and cruelty seldom found in other
countries…the Chinese proletariat came under the
leadership of its own revolutionary party-the Communist
Party of China-and became the most politically
conscious class in Chinese society...the Chinese
proletariat by origin is largely made up of bankrupted
peasants, it has natural ties with the peasant masses,
which facilitated its forming a close alliance with them. 46
While the merits of this philosophy can be debated, the innate
conservativeness of the countryside is an accurate supposition, due in
part to Chiang Kai-shek only extending his direct rule over the cities and
the areas directly surrounding them. Mao picked up on this point early on
and knew that the countryside was where the revolution would ultimately
begin because it could, and would, be used as a base area to organize the
majority of the population into a force to bring communism to the
nation.47 In essence, even though Mao was pragmatic enough to realize
that he needed to rely on the peasantry and the masses to effect
revolutionary change, the title “peasant revolutionary” may not be an
accurate one to assign to him due to his continual support for a
proletarian leadership over them. Ultimately though, the Chinese
Revolution still took on an aura of Mao-centrism, later termed “Mao
Zedong thought” or “Maoism” in Yan’an,48 proving that without Mao,
the CCP likely would not have had the same identity because it had
become dependent on him as their leader.
Even though Mao Zedong chose to live among the peasants
during the revolution, he never truly meshed with them and lived as they
did, which resulted in difficulties in getting them to agree with his
notions of land reform and personal revolutionary ideals. This is a topic
that will be discussed further in the next section. Gandhi, however,
decided upon a Spartan lifestyle and full integration with the peasants.49
“Gandhi had an uncanny, mysterious gift which kept him at all times in
tune with the prevalent feelings and emotions of India's inarticulate
peasants.”50 What made this even more unifying for the Indians was that
Gandhi was from a relatively well-off family and had a decent law career
that he chose to give up in favor of living among the poorer
46

Mao, On Revolution and War, 149.
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groups/castes,51 all in order to get the general populace involved and to
lift them out of their circumstances. Most importantly, Gandhi held a
similar view of both the peasantry and working class that Mao had in
China.
Comparable to the makeup of the Chinese, the Indian peasantry
made up a majority of the population, and even though the working class
was not as tiny as it was in China, it was still rather small to say the least.
Gandhi advocated that the peasantry should be fully involved in the
political and revolutionary processes and in democracy as a whole, but
must be led by the intellectuals/working class of the country.52 While
Mao would not have openly approved of the leadership of intellectuals as
a class, as was shown when he ordered the execution of liberal
intellectual Wang Shiwei in 1947 during the evacuation of Yan’an,53 he
wholly agreed with the domination by the proletariat and urban working
class over the peasantry, and for the same reasons that Gandhi espoused.
Although Bolshevik ideas spread throughout India after Lenin’s death in
1924, there is no evidence that Gandhi himself was affected by Marxism
or Leninism beyond his saying:
India does not want Bolshevism. The people are too
peaceful to stand anarchy. They will bow to the knee
who restores so called order. Let us recognise the Indian
psychology….The average Mussalman of India is quite
different than the average Mussalman of the other part of
the world. The Hindu is proverbially, almost completely
mild. The Parsi and the Christian love peace more than
strike. Indeed, we have almost made religion subservient
to peace.54
After stating this clear understanding of the Indian people and being
pragmatic enough to mold himself into the preexisting feelings in order
to achieve success in their movement, Gandhi refused to accept
invitations to visit the Soviet Union in the 1920s,55 but the similarity of
his ideals to the underlying concepts of Marxist thought, especially
proletarian dominance over the peasantry, is striking.
In addition, both Gandhi and Mao were anti-imperialists, as
mentioned above, but even though Mao entirely despised imperialism,
Gandhi hated it because he felt that the practice had been perpetuated to
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divide and destroy the consciousness of the Indian people.56 As a result,
Gandhi chose to eat frugally and shed a safe home and career in order to
live in the simple dress (he only owned one shirt) and poor sanitary
conditions that the peasants were forced to toil under. He further gained
the admiration of the peasants by trying to restore Indian self-respect57
and by utilizing symbols that would get everyone involved in one way or
another. The Spinning Wheel, which is now on the flag of India, was
used to gain the support of women and promote equality for them,58
(Gandhi understood that “no mass movement could be successful
without the ‘muted’ sections of society” and heavily encouraged female
involvement because they fell into that category.)59 something Mao was
attempting to accomplish as well. This was also aimed at stimulating a
national interest, and nationalism specifically, in Indian cloth over that
which came from England. Their fabric could easily be created by Indian
women on their own spinning wheels with the huge quantities of
domestic cotton, the main reason for Gandhi seeing the imports as
asinine and unnecessary.60 Not doing so, “was to Gandhi's mind a waste
of both substance and opportunities of poor people in a country where
cotton abounded;”61 as a result, he believed that “the dumping down of
foreign cloth in India has reduced millions of my people to pauperism.”62
The term used by Gandhi to describe this was Swadeshi, which roughly
refers to an emphasis on domestic production and consumption, as well
as the rejection of foreign-made goods.63 Furthermore, the famous
violation of the Salt Tax by Gandhi, which everyone suffered from
because salt was one of the few seasonings that Indians could afford and
produce on their own, achieved a mass following that succeeded in
garnering the support of most of the masses.64 Again, most importantly,
the disobedience in choosing to create their own salt despite the ban
encouraged crucial female involvement. These symbols were coined, and
these actions executed, to show the British that they were more than
capable of, and interested in, running their own economy and country.
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Gandhi was completely committed to promoting equality and
democracy in India in order to continue keeping mass involvement in the
important events of the country and to facilitate better communication
among the people. As mentioned earlier, Gandhi utilized symbols to not
only engage women in the struggle, but to make them feel included and
consulted in the revolutionary process; and not “ignorant of the prevalent
political situation”65 currently underway. Also, he envisioned a society
that was not necessarily a utopia of collaboration, but one based on the
need for teamwork; not on a government that told everyone what to do.
This led Gandhi to accept a de-centralized democracy because he felt
that industry must work cooperatively with farmers and that society must
not treat any individual as untouchable, 66 two things that having a
centralized democracy like Mao had in China did not do. In essence, he
believed that “individuals and groups must function non-violently
through mutual aid and cooperation”67 to bring about a lasting peace, not
violence and rigid conformity to party doctrine.
This is why much of Gandhi’s ideologies were based on some
level of understanding, compromise, and cooperation. As a result, he felt
it was possible to persuade the British to leave voluntarily through
diplomacy and that it was possible to include everyone in the struggle for
freedom, not just a single class that would simply take over and continue
oppressive policies. Most importantly, he also promoted collaboration
between the Muslims and Hindus, because despite their differences,
Gandhi knew that in order for a revolution to succeed there had to be an
“Indian United Front” of not only the different social classes but also of
the different religions and economic backgrounds.68 As he argued:
"Muslim-Hindu unity must be our creed to last for all time and under all
circumstances."69 With this mass movement, non-violence and peaceful
non-cooperation could be successful; without it, the British would
continue to be able to divide and control the Indian people. In many
ways, Mao and the CCP felt the same way about the necessity of a mass
movement, and this is why they promoted such a diverse coalition
against not only the Japanese and other imperialists, but also the
Nationalist Party during the civil war and World War II.
To both figures, a revolution had to be a popular movement of
the peasantry, led by the proletariat (and also the intellectuals in
Gandhi’s case), that would affect revolutionary change. Without the
unity among the classes and the masses, the revolutionary movement
65
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would be less likely to succeed. While class roles were far more strictly
enforced in the Chinese Revolution, the Indians did utilize a loose class
structure because “as it is, the rich are discontented no less than the
poor,” and this alliance was aimed at promoting equality and cooperation
to succeed in the struggle against an occupying force.70 Both of these
men were powerful and innovative coalition builders who were able to
unite their fragmented organizations, despite preexisting notions of who
Mao was during the time period in question. Essentially, the ideals of
Gandhi and Mao embodied their respective revolutions and were
especially applicable above all other alternatives, and this made them
indispensable to their countries, their peoples, their revolutionary
movements, and the contexts of their time in general.

Divergent Pragmatism
This paper will now compare the most divisive characteristic which
delineates Gandhi and Mao, that of advocacy for non-violence and
violence, respectively. While this has been briefly touched upon already,
it will be covered more in-depth here. It is important to note that this
discussion will not be aimed at debating the merits of either ideology, but
will show that even though violence and non-violence are obviously
antithetical, both figures arrived at their philosophies for the same
reason: that their chosen approach was best for their movements, even
though the same reasons led to diverging conclusions. As a result, they
were willing to do whatever was necessary to win power for their
organizations, and did so in order to maneuver into the position of using
any desirable instrument to their advantage. Seeing the two men in this
manner pulls them down from the mythical status assigned to them and
shows who they truly were, pragmatic men who used ideologies which
would foster both unity and support within the confines of their fragile
alliances.
Many people, including a number of Maoists, have viewed
Gandhi’s use of non-violence as a sign of weakness which led to India
remaining in a state of perpetual colonialism modeled on the former
British administration,71 a perspective that is simply not true. “In general,
violent overthrow of the government has been the popular method
adopted by revolutionaries irrespective of their creed, nationality, or
race,”72 but there is no prerequisite that all must be; Gandhi has been the
notable exception to that rule. No two revolutions are the same, because
70
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even if one replicated the same circumstances, there would probably be
different results due to the unpredictability of human nature. Gandhi saw
the need for a “constructive revolution” which would build a new state,
not a destructive one that would delay progress.73 “The constructive
program was an essential component of Gandhian revolutionary struggle
for Indian independence. It was the constructive program which gave
content to the satyagraha framework and applied the Gandhian
principles to the Indian circumstances.”74 Being constructive, rather than
destructive, was a vital piece of the Indian struggle for freedom, and
Gandhi was pragmatic enough to realize this; non-violence was
necessary not only because of the nervous nature of those in their
movement, but also because they did not want to destroy their own
society in the process of gaining independence. Whereas on a base level,
all revolutionary leaders would probably agree with this, most would see
the constructive aspect of the revolution being the result of the
destructive one because it is necessary to destroy in order to create; Mao
would of course agree with this stance. Gandhi, however, felt that the use
of colonial violence against colonizers, in order to free themselves from
the colonizer (the exact idea the Militant Nationalists were advocating),
was an oxymoron and that it would undermine the goals of the Indian
people.75 “Secrecy and terrorism led to demoralisation and wastage,
while Gandhi sought to bring revolution by converting the adversary to
his point of view and enlisting him in the brotherhood of man.”76 This is
why Gandhi cultivated so many relationships with British people living
in South Africa and India, because he did not want to lead an
underground movement, but one that had a moral creed and did things in
the light of day; not in dark alleyways. He essentially believed (and so
did the Indian people of course) that clandestine/armed operations to gain
their freedom would fail, and consequently make it even more difficult to
achieve independence due to the duplication of the death and violence
used by imperialists and colonists.
As a result, it is more appropriate to look upon Gandhi as a
diplomat and social reformer, rather than an outright revolutionary; at
least when one is employing the modern sense of the word. A pivotal
aspect of the revolution for him was to bring the colonizer over to his
way of thinking peacefully, not through direct conflict, and he worked
with the British tirelessly to achieve this goal. In addition, he not only
forced himself, but also convinced all of his followers through careful
deliberation, to practice self-restraint and control when dealing with the
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English throughout their everyday lives and during the revolution.77 Due
to this, the word diplomat can be assigned to Gandhi because he wanted
to work within the bounds of the established system in order to be able to
defy and defeat that system.
To Gandhi, non-violence meant “infinite love.”78 The most
accurate way to explain this would be to loosely think of the old Hippy
adage: “Make love, not war.” Gandhi was nowhere near the type of
enemy to the British that Mao was to the Nationalists, and knew that he
could work with them toward an amicable solution that would benefit
both their peoples. He felt, and promoted, the feeling that the British
should not be ashamed to bow out of India, even if it was during the
Second World War. As Gandhi said in June, 1942:
If British Power is withdrawn from India in an orderly
manner, Britain will be relieved of the burden of keeping
peace in India, and at the same time gain in a free India
an ally not in the cause of Empire-because she would
have renounced in toto all her imperial designs-but in
defense, not pretended but wholly real, of human
freedom. 79
This was because even though India would remain neutral, the Allies
would still be allowed to use Indian rail and supply lines to benefit their
war efforts.80 Added to this, even if the Japanese were able to succeed in
their invasion of Indian Territory, they would be non-violently resisted in
the same manner that the British currently were, and this would be
equally effective against them as it had been against the English.81
With regards to the Japanese and allowing India to be a quasisupporter of the British and their allies during the war if they pulled out,
Gandhi actually took the time to acknowledge others’ contributions
against their mutual enemies. Even though he may not have agreed with
either’s ideals, he said the cost that the Russians and Chinese had paid to
fight the Axis powers had been enormous, and he sympathized with their
plight.82 Gandhi disapproved of Japanese aggression as much as anyone
in China, but said that “China never tried any experiment with nonviolence. That the Chinese remained passive for some time is no proof
that it was a non-violent attitude."83 Consequently, their violence against
the Japanese (and others) only caused more pain and suffering, and led to
77
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further suppression during their occupation. While many in India had
grown impatient with the non-violence that Gandhi advocated and
desired quicker results (something similar to the assertiveness of Mao in
China),84 most still agreed that violence, especially when the British were
in a state of war, would get them nowhere and that self-restraint was a
watchword for their success.
This paper has been intentionally general with the exact
terminology that Gandhi employed to describe his ideals because a
thorough discussion of the application of the concepts and ideals
themselves, not the names, would lead to a better understanding of his
beliefs; but some are nevertheless unavoidable, namely, Satyagraha and
ahimsa. For all intents and purposes, these were the words that Gandhi
used in all aspects of his revolution, and the former basically meant a
general focus on the pursuit of truth and firmness while the latter can be
interpreted to mean non-violence.85 All of his followers were required to
take vows of (translated to their English equivalents): truth, nonviolence, chastity, non-possession, fearlessness, palate control, nonstealing, bread-labor, equality of religions, anti-untouchability, and use
of locally made goods.86 To Gandhi, all of these related to truth and were
aimed at making people understand that “man is not capable of knowing
the absolute truth and, therefore not competent to punish;”87 hence, nonviolence and non-cooperation/civil disobedience with laws they found
corrupt and immoral were what was necessary to win the revolution.
Most of this was linked to how Gandhi promoted an allencompassing use of religion as well. Although it is important to reiterate
that he encouraged cooperation between both Muslims and Hindus
(another uncommon belief that Gandhi promoted in the pursuit of unity
for his movement), it is crucial to note that he said that every Satyagrahi
(i.e., a person who practices Satyagraha) must have an unshakeable faith
in God.88 This is because he saw that life persists in the midst of
destruction and violence, and that there must be a higher power and law
than any that humanity could impose.89 All of his ideals and thoughts
were aimed at creating a spirit among the Indian people that would wish
to gain their freedom with minimal bloodshed and in a manner which
was applicable to the mood of the time. India had always been a rather
religious society, but never had a violent revolutionary culture. Gandhi
was one of the few who was truly able to grasp this and be pragmatic
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enough as to apply his philosophy in a way that would engender mass
popular support.
In contrast, the Chinese people had not necessarily always been
as violent as Gandhi claimed, but had indeed chosen over thousands of
years to use force of arms to remove a dynasty or ruler that had lost its
“mandate of heaven.” This is the exact reason why Gandhi said that
China had never attempted a non-violent solution to a governmental or
imperial problem, and is also the reason why so many people agreed with
Mao’s feelings that a violent revolution was necessary; because it had
become so engrained in the consciousness of the Chinese people.
Consequently, pursuing a course of action which included armed
insurrection was in the best interests of Chinese Communist Party
doctrine.
To succeed in assimilating the support of the people, Mao
pursued what Arif Dirlik has termed the “Sinification of Marxism,” or
the “Marxification of Chineseness.” 90 The ideas of Marx, Engels, and
Lenin were excellent templates for Mao, but his pragmatism made him
realize that it was necessary to gain popular support by having a rural
revolution, as mentioned earlier. This required modifying Marxism to the
Chinese situation, even though the roots that called for a violent upheaval
remained unaltered. Essentially, this became the nationalization of
Marxism in order to give a Chinese identity to the revolution that people
there could relate to.
As Mao saw it, “the seizure of power by armed force, the
settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of
revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good
universally, for China and for all other countries.”91 This exact concept
was what should be the driving force and central task to any insurrection
as he understood it, and the CCP followed it accordingly. While this may
have fundamentally been more violent than what much of the peasantry
were accustomed to, it does not negate the fact that Mao knew the idea
was already there, he just had to encourage the growth of it. Mao
believed that imperialists, colonizers, or any other type of occupiers in
general would never relinquish their control or lay down their weapons
without the people forcing them to do so with some form of violent
attack.92 Even though the idea that China’s problems could only be
solved through armed force was an integral CCP stance from the
beginnings of the party, Mao was the one who applied it to the peasantry
and not just the urban working class; this made him an important figure
in the eyes of the masses and capable of leading because he had garnered
their support.
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Furthermore, this adds an additional link to why the topic of land
reform was so important to Mao and the Communists, it was to placate
the peasantry. Taking lands from lords and wealthy land-owners that had
been using it to collect oppressive and impoverishing taxes from the rural
classes (and then to redistribute it among them) would significantly
improve their chances of gaining the trust of China’s masses. By
reallocating the land, the peasants would have more of a say in their
everyday lives and thus would be motivated to follow the CCP in
revolutionary endeavors. Mao’s charisma continued to sell this policy,
and it reaped him a great deal of power and prestige among the masses,
something that no other party member could muster in a comparable
quantity that would have challenged Mao during the revolution.
The arguable culmination of pre-1949 Maoism was the
Rectification Campaign in 1942. Principally, the point of the campaign
was to root out corruption within the party that had surfaced while at
Yan’an, and a great deal of this was done violently.93 Class struggle itself
was advocated by many members of the CCP (Liu Shaoqi being a
noteworthy example)94 and while it was meant to be a way to eliminate
classes altogether and promote a forum in which all members of the party
could express their opinions, it became a battleground for factional
fighting and bitter political division. Mao aimed the Rectification
Campaign at destroying the contradictions within the party caused from
this and to forcefully reform the new wave of recruits received as a result
of the Mass Exodus from the urban areas during the Japanese invasion to
make sure they were more in line with party doctrine. To do this, he
departed from the conservative and pragmatic land reform policies that
the CCP had been utilizing before toward radical ones that were intended
to force the peasantry to adapt to Mao’s thinking, instead of the other
way around. There was vicious backlash from this shift to immediate
change, as opposed to the moderate program the peasants had been
accustomed to, and this caused Mao to realize that he had to re-adapt his
ideals to better suit the people once again. After learning from his
mistakes, Mao reasserted his pragmatism in the mid-1940s; had he not
done so, he could have lost a great deal of support, and the movement
may well have faltered. This event, nevertheless, marked the point where
Mao began to move away from his pre-1949 realism. Afterwards, he
indeed became the devoted advocate of class struggle in the People’s
Republic of China period which people remember him for, and have
chosen to incorrectly apply to his entire life. This exact illusion is the one
in which this paper has been attempting to dispel.
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This is why Mao continued to promote a theory that called for
continuous revolution (as can be seen in the Cultural Revolution of 19661976)95 after this campaign, and this was an essential extension of the
idea that rectification of the party was necessary, all in order to make
sure that the revolution would continue advancing with the people and be
on-going to deny individuals the possibility of becoming lax with
Communist philosophy. Surprisingly, Gandhi also advocated “permanent
revolution,” but it was only aimed at adapting to the everyday changes of
Indian society to make sure that the revolution would not remain static,96
rather than attempting to enforce some dogma over a prolonged period of
time. Mao and Gandhi understood the necessity in this period to not only
adjust their ideologies to better suit their environments and then to
advocate for them, but both men also grasped that they had to continue
the revolution in spirit after it was physically over, because the task of
nation-building would then begin in the aftermath of the
withdrawal/defeat of an occupier or subversive governing body.

A Pragmatic Post-Mortem
Mao became preoccupied with the constant need for violent upheaval,
both during and after the revolution. He saw a future for his people that
included a destruction of any last vestige of colonialism or oppression, as
well as a lasting society that was devoid of the kinds of classes that could
potentially promote capitalism and endorse a return to the Nationalist
Party’s decadence. Mao believed in mass participation in politics and
complete conformity to party doctrine and ideals. Additionally, he was a
charismatic individual who was able to win over leadership of the party
and guide the CCP, and the revolution, in a direction which would follow
a modified Marxian framework that was spearheaded by a desire for
violent, rapid, and immediate change to their present circumstances.
Although he may have left his pre-1949 pragmatism by the wayside once
he gained power, he undeniably made realistic contributions to their
movement before the PRC was founded.
Gandhi, likewise, was an anti-imperialist who longed for the day
when the Indian people would no longer live under British rule and could
manage their own affairs. He also believed in involving everyone in the
society, including those from every caste and religious background. This
was aimed at creating an atmosphere of internal cooperation first in order
to be able to cooperate with England and convince them to leave their
country. Unlike Mao, Gandhi and the Indian people were non-violent,
and he adjusted his ideology to better suit that reality. Even though it is
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difficult to discern if Gandhi would have also abandoned his pragmatic
nature after independence, because of his assassination, it seems unlikely
that would have been the case with his long record of non-violence and
peaceful non-cooperation up to that date.
Simply put, even though the nature and beliefs of the Indian and
Chinese freedom organizations toward the type of revolution required
were completely different, they were both led by men capable of working
with the people at the peasant level and who amended their ideas and
thoughts to better conform to the feelings of that class. Without the
presence of these two figures, the Indian and Chinese revolutions would
have had radically different ideologies, as no other person could have
taken their place and fostered the same kind of revolutionary fervor and
cooperation which Mao and Gandhi’s pragmatism were capable of
creating. Even though there were others who led at various points during
the revolutions, most were either unwilling or unable to adapt to what the
general mood of the time required, and chose instead to pursue a
philosophy that the majority could not rally behind. Furthermore, even
though each group had other important leaders (because no one person
can lead a movement on his/her own), such as the examples of
Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai who were mentioned in the
introduction to this paper, these other leaders were dwarfed by Gandhi
and Mao and came to be men who worked behind-the-scenes instead of
in the forefront.
Whether Nehru or Zhou could have taken over and become the
figures that Mao and Gandhi were in the event of their deaths or
absences before independence is pure speculation. It does raise
interesting questions, however, about whether the two men explored in
this paper were absolutely vital to their revolutions, or just that the
people had become psychologically dependent on them, because they
had adapted to what the country needed when no other person had been
able to in a comparable fashion. This may well be a topic which can be
explored further and would shed additional light on these two figures, but
it outside the purview of this examination.
Mao Zedong and Mohandas Gandhi, nevertheless, personified
their revolutions because the masses came to rely on them as their
respective leaders as time passed and when no other person rose to
challenge them with a comparable pragmatism or ideology which would
have competed with the popularity of theirs. Although it is an easy
exercise to say that they were the only people who could have led the
Chinese and Indian revolutions, this argument cannot be substantiated.
As this paper argued, however, they did come to characterize their
movements and were the only ones able to adapt their beliefs, in the
same way and at the same time, to the atmosphere present in their
country’s revolutionary alliances. This resulted in Mao and Gandhi
becoming integral figures in the minds of their people, hence the
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mythical status which has been assigned to them, and explains why this
paper tried to bring them down from that pedestal and see them for who
they were, revolutionary pragmatists.
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